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In 1977, the Chicago Police Department opened itsfiles concerning police-in-
volved shootings to inspection by a public interest group, the Chicago Law Enforcement
Study Group. This represents the ftrst time a major cits police force has allowed its
shooting investigation files to be viewed by the public. The following article is based
on excerptsfiom that group's report. The study is presented in two parts. Theftst set
of material, presented in 72 J. CRiM. L. & C. 1813 (1981), dealt with the method-
ology, shooting types and racial factors involved in the shootings. The set of data
presented in this issue deals with shootings ofpolice officers, variations in shootings
over time and recommendations for shooting control strategies.
THE EDITORS
SHOOTINGS OF AND BY CHICAGO
POLICE: UNCOMMON CRISES
PART II: SHOOTINGS OF POLICE,
SHOOTING CORRELATES AND
CONTROL STRATEGIES
WILLIAM A. GELLER* AND KEVIN J. KARALES**
Unlike much of the empirical literature on police shootings, this
article devotes attention not only to police use of deadly force against
civilians but to police victimization as well.' This broadened focus
stems from the conviction that minimizing police victimization is an
equally important goal to minimizing inappropriate police use of deadly
force, and from the belief that the latter objective can best be accom-
plished by understanding as fully as possible the risks that officers face of
being shot. Following a description and analysis of the incidents in
which 187 Chicago police officers were shot-by civilians, by them-
selves, and by fellow officers-from 1974 through 1978, this article will
examine factors that might be associated with and help explain annual
variations in the number of civilians shot by Chicago police. Finally, we
* Research Attorney, American Bar Foundation; J.D., University of Chicago School of
Law, 1975. At the time this piece was written, Mr. Geller was the Director of the Chicago
Law Enforcement Study Group.
** Research Associate, Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group.
1 Of the few other recent studies that examine the causes and prevention of shootings of
police officers, the best are Fyfe, Always Prepared Police Of9Duly Guns, 452 ANNALS 72 (1980);
Margarita, Killing the Police, 452 ANNALS 63 (1980); Margarita, Police As Vcim of Violence, 5
JUST. Sys. J. 218 (1980); M. MARGARITA, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE AGAINST POLICE IN THE
UNITED STATES (forthcoming).
GELLER AND KARALES
will briefly discuss a variety of strategies that police administrators in
Chicago and other jurisdictions may find helpful in reducing the level of
police-involved shooting.
I. SHOOTINGS OF POLICE OFFICERS
As was the case with our typology of officers' reasons for shooting
civilians in part I of this article, our typology of officer victimization
(Figure 1) is framed with shooting reduction in mind. Since officer pro-
tection strategies are likely to vary according to whether the officer is
shot intentionally or accidentally, the typology uses the intent of the
perpetrator as one of its key divisions. Apart from suicides, however, all
shootings of police by themselves or other officers were reported to be
unintentional, and virtually all shootings of police by civilians were re-
FIGURE 1




ported to be intentional; so for convenience the typology's principal sepa-
ration of shootings is according to the perpetrator: civilians, other
officers, and self-inflicted shootings.
The typology can be fleshed out briefly, after which two issues
which emerge from the data will be considered: why so many police are
shot while off duty, and racial patterns in shootings of police by civil-
ians. Perhaps the most striking feature of Figure 1 is the number of
officer victims who were shot by themselves or their colleagues: between
thirty-eight and forty-two percent2 of the 187 officers who were shot
from 1974 through 1978 were shot by themselves or other officers. This
rather alarming realization may help broaden the perspective which one
normally brings to a consideration of the undeniable hazards of police
work.
A. SHOOTING TYPES
(I) Police Shot by Civilians
Shootings of officers by civilians occurred in a wide array of situa-
tions, ranging from suspected crimes in progress to officers shot with
their own guns by a spouse or lover. To a much greater extent than
shootings of civilians by police, shootings of police by civilians take place
off duty. While 23% of all civilian victims were shot by off-duty police,
44% of the 108 police who were shot by civilians were off duty at the
time. Six of the 108 officers (5.6%) were unintentionally3 shot by civil-
ians. All six of the unintentional shootings of police by civilians seemed
to involve some degree of carelessness on the part of the officer. Four of
these incidents were "accidental" (ie., the civilian did not intend to pull
the trigger); one involved "mistaken identity;" and one was the result of
"dry firing" a weapon that was thought to be unloaded.
(2) Self-Inflicted Shootings
Self-inflicted shootings by police, which accounted for 27% (51) of
all officer gunshot victims, occurred in three basic situation types: sui-
cides; accidental discharges during the maintenance or other "non-com-
bat" handling of the weapon; and accidental firings in the course of
2 The range results from the eight officers whose assailants were not ascertainable from
the source documents. If all eight officers were shot by civilians, the 38% figure would apply.
If all eight officers were shot by themselves or fellow officers, the higher percentage would be
accurate.
3 The characterization of these shootings as unintentional is based on several elements:
the civilians claimed that they shot unintentionally, they were not criminally charged, and
officer testimony corroborated the lack of intent.
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attempting arrests. Strategies for reducing the incidence of such shoot-
ings are suggested later in this article.
The Chicago Police Department reported ten officer suicides and
one suicide attempt for the five year study period. (These numbers ex-
clude any suicides accomplished by means other than firearms because
we do not have data on officer non-gun suicides.) While this figure com-
putes to an annual average of only two gun-suicides for the Department,
the officer gun-suicide rate is actually slightly higher than the overall
rate (all means) for Chicago's adult population. In 1977, Chicagoans 18
years of age and older committed suicide at the rate of approximately 13
persons per 100,000 residing in the city.4 The average gun-suicide rate
for Chicago police officers, however, is 15 per 100,000 officers. Whether
this difference in rates represents a significant difference between the
general populace and police is difficult to judge based on the number of
officer suicides that occurred and the exclusion of non-gun suicides.
One could assume with some confidence that some additional number
of Chicago police officers committed suicide during the study period by
means other than guns, and that the total Chicago police officer suicide
rate is actually higher than 15 per 100,000. The stresses, odd and varia-
ble working hours and other aspects of police work might help explain a
disproportionate suicide rate for police officers. 5
(3) Police Shot by Fellow Oftiers
Eleven percent (20) of all officers shot from 1974 through 1978 were
shot by other police officers. Shootings of police by fellow officers re-
sulted primarily from accidental gun discharges. Some incidents seemed
to be the result of bad gun handling habits by officers (e.g., an officer
was struck by a ricocheted bullet from a gun that was holstered in the
half-cocked position by a fellow officer during roll call). Other incidents
resulted from stray bullets during shootouts and possibly from poor tac-
tical coordination among several officers on a crime scene (e.g., officers
getting in the line of fire).
4 Telephone conversation with James Walker, Division of Planning, Center for Health
Statistics, State of Illinois (Dec. 30, 1980).
5 Edward Donovan, founder of the Boston Stress Counseling Program for Police Officers,
indicated in a recent filmed interview that he believes "suicides are more prevalent in law
enforcement professions than in any other, although often these incidents are not recorded as
suicides." The interview is part of a police training film, Interview with Edward Donovan on
Stress, produced by Harper and Row, reported in NCJRS, SELECTIVE NOTIFICATION OF
INFORMATION 24 (Dec. 1980). New York City police officers suffer a reported suicide rate
twice as high as that of the City's white male population. Fyfe, Shots Fired: A Typological
Examination of New York City Police Firearms Discharges, 1971-1975, 476 (1978) (unpub-




A few noteworthy patterns concerning shootings of police officers
emerge from the data, most notably those associated with off-duty shoot-
ings and with the race of the participants. Any attempt to devise strate-
gies for reducing the number of police officers who are shot should
probably take into account the fact that a majority (52%) of the officer
victims are off-duty when shot.6 This is important because the kinds of
control strategies available may differ significantly for on- and off-duty
officers. Table 1 shows the number of on- and off-duty officers shot,
according to shooting type. - .
TABLE 1
POLICE SHOT IN CHICAGO, 1974-1978: DUTY STATUS OF
OFFICER VICTIMS BY SHOOTING TYPE
DUTY STATUS
SHOOTING TYPE OF OFFICER VICTIMS
On Off Total
(1) By civilian Number 61 47 108
Row % 56% 44% 100%
(2) Self-Inflicted Accidental 10 30 40
25% 75% 100%
Suicide 0 11 11
- 100% 100%
(3) By other Officers Number 15 5 20
Row % 75% 25% ,100%
TOTAL Number 86 93 179a
Row% 48% 52% 100%
a Not ascertained = 8.
It is noteworthy that, while a majority of all officer victims are off-
duty when shot, the duty status of officers varies considerably by shoot-
ing type. Only self-inflicted gun shot wounds are mainly an off-duty
phenomenon (75% of the accidentals and all of the suicides occurred
during the officers' time off). The large number of self-inflicted shoot-
ings that occur while officers are off-duty is a key explanation for why so
large a percentage of all officer victims are off-duty when shot. Since
many self-inflicted wounds are the result of gun maintenance (an off-
duty activity), it is not particularly surprising that most of the self-in-
flicted shootings are off-duty events. Shootings by fellow officers, which




are relatively few in number, are predominantly an on-duty phenome-
non. Shootings by civilians are closer to being evenly divided between
on- and off-duty events, as Table 1 shows.
In addition to the concentration of off-duty officers among self-in-
flicted shooting victims, two other explanations can be offered for the
large number of officers who are shot while off duty. Both concern
shootings of police by civilians. First, Police Department policy requires
off-duty officers to take appropriate police action when they encounter
possible criminal activity. Police officers traditionally have considereds-
their responsibility for off-duty action to include aggressive intervention
(termination of crimes and arrest of suspects) and not just careful obser-
vation and notification of on-duty police. Yet off-duty police may be
unprepared for a confrontation with armed opponents, who frequently
will have the element of surprise, in their favor. Moreover, off-duty of-
ficers usually intervene in a suspected crime on their own initiative
rather than at the request of a member of the public, which may deprive
off-duty officers of some "legitimacy" and may make forceful resistance
to their authority more likely.7 The arming of off-duty police, a practice
which is receiving increasing criticism,8 facilitates such aggressive action.
The result of large-scale, aggressive intervention by off-duty officers is
that off-duty police run almost the same risk of being shot by civilians as
do on-duty officers.
Interestingly, however, the circumstances in which on- and off-duty
officers are shot by civilians vary, as Table 2 indicates. On-duty officers
were shot by civilians most commonly when the officers responded to
"person with a gun" or "shots fired" incidents. Suspected armed rob-
beries accounted for less than one on-duty officer victim per year (total
of four during the study period). In contrast, 33% (15) of all off-duty
officer victims were shot in connection with alleged armed robberies.
This difference stems from the fact that in many of the off-duty robbery
related shootings the officers were the robbery victims and thus were at
a tactical disadvantage. A relatively large percentage (20%) of the inci-
dents in which off-duty officers were shot involved officers who were not
taking police action (e.g., officers shot during their own domestic
quarrels).
The second explanation we can offer for the large number of off-
duty police who are shot by civilians leads once again to a consideration
of race and police shootings, but this time in relation to officer victimiza-
tion. The explanation is that the number of off-duty officer victims is
swelled by the large number of off-duty black officer victims-who live
and spend most of their off-duty time in relatively high-crime areas of




INCIDENTS OF OFFICERS SHOT BY CIVILIANS IN CHICAGO, 1974-
1978: SITUATION TYPE BY OFFICER DUTY STATUS
SITUATION TYPEa DUTY STATUS OF VICTIM OFFICERS
On Off Total
# % * % # %
Armed/strong arm robb. 4 7% 15 33% 19 18%
Person with a gun/shots
fired 19 32% 5 11% 24 23%
Handling prisoners 1 2% 0 - 1 1%
Burglary 2 3% 0 - 2 2%
Suspicious person 5 8% 2 4% 7 7%
Person shot/otherwise
injured/screaming for help
(includes rape) 3 5% 2 4% 5 5%
Nondomestic disturbance,
riot, person with deadly
weapon other than gun 5 8% 5 11% 10 9%
Domestic disturbance 3 5% 1 2% 4 4%
Traffic offense, auto
pursuit/stop 2 3% 2 4% 4 4%
Assault or crime on officer
(incl. ambush) 5 8% 2 4% 7 7%
Not police business 1 2% 9 20% 10 9%
Vice (drug or sex) offenses 10 17% 3 7% 13 12%
TOTAL 6 0 b 100% 46c 100% 10 6 d 100%
e
a Based on the officers' initial perceptions, which almost invariably were reported to
have been accurate.
b Not ascertained = 1.
C Not ascertained = 1.
d Not ascertained = 2.
C Does not total 100% due to rounding.
quency and, accordingly, are shot with some frequency, just as on-duty
officers of all races who regularly encounter serious crime suspects are
shot with some frequency. Table 3 offers evidence for this explanation.
It shows the distribution of on- and off-duty officer victims of different
7 See A. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (1971).
8 Fyfe, supra note 1.
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races, according to the crime level of the districts in which they were
shot by civilians.
Table 3 shows both the number of officer victims and the rates at
which they were shot, based on the average annual number of officers of
a given race shot per 1,000 officers of that race on the Chicago police
force. As indicated, shootings of black off-duty officers help account for
the large number of off-duty police victims. Black officers constituted
51% of the forty-five off-duty officers who were shot by civilians, despite
the fact that only 17.4% of the Police Department's sworn personnel are
black. The reported residential pattern of black officers (mostly in me-
dium- and high-crime districts) seems the most likely explanation for the
distribution of off-duty black officer victims, 91% of whom were shot by
civilians in such districts.9
TABLE 3
POLICE SHOT BY CIVILIANS IN CHICAGO, 1974-1978: OFFICER
VICTIMS' RACE AND DUTY STATUS, BY CRIME LEVEL OF
SHOOTING LOCATION
CRIiME LEVEL RACE OF OFFICER VICTIMS
OF LOCATION White Black Hispanic TOTAL
Lowa N= 15 4 1 20
Total Rateb= 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.3
Bjy Q Qff Qa Qff Qa Qff Qa Qff
Duy 8 7 2 2 1 0 11 9
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 - 0.2 0.1
Medium c  25 12 0 37
Total 0.5 1.0 - 0.6
By Qa Qff Qa Qff Qa Qff Qa Qff
Duty 16 9 6 6 0 0 22 15
0.3 0.2 0.5 0.5 - - 0.3 0.2
Highd 23 22 1 46
Total 0.4 1.9 0.8 0.7
B OQ off Qa off On Off On Off
Duty 18 5 7 15 0 1 25 21
0.3 0.1 0.6 1.3 - 0.8 0.4 0.3
TOTAL 63 38 2 103e
Total 1.2 3.3 1.7 1.5
By on Off On Off On Off On off
Duty 42 21 15 23 1 1 58 45
0.8 0.4 1.3 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7
a Low-crime districts are those with 200 or less forcible felonies (crimes of personal violence plus burgla-
ry) per 10,000 population per year.
b All rates - average annual number of officers shot by civilians per 1,000 officers of the indicated race
on the Chicago police force.
c Medium-crime districts are those with 201-300 forcible felonies per 10,000 population per year.
d High-crime districts are those with more than 300 forcible felonies per 10,000 population per year.
e Not ascertained = 5.
9 As is the case with much of the analysis in part I of this article, if multivariate analysis
had been possible here, it might have yielded interesting results. In the future, it might be
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Besides helping to explain why police are shot while off-duty in rel-
atively large numbers, Table 3 suggests some points about race and
shootings of police officers. Without regard to duty status, black officers
are nearly three times more likely than white officers to be shot by civil-
ians (rates of 3.3 versus 1.2). (We indicated in part I of this article that
black officers were also more likely than white officers to shoot civilians.)
Taking duty status into account pinpoints the same difference we saw
with shootings of civilians. Among on-duty officers, black police are 1.6
times more likely than their white colleagues to be shot by civilians
(rates of 1.3 versus 0.8); but while off duty, black officers are five times as
likely as white officers to be shot by civilians (rates of 2.0 versus 0.4).
Like the high rate of shooting by off-duty black officers, this phenome-
non probably is the product of police officers' residential patterns.
TABLE 4
ON-DUTY POLICE SHOT BY CIVILIANS IN CHICAGO, 1974-1978:
UNITS OF ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICER VICTIMS AND BLACK
REPRESENTATION IN UNITS
OFFICER VICTIMS' OFFICERS % OF PERSONNEL
UNITS OF SHOT BY IN UNIT WHO
ASSIGNMENT CIVILIANS ARE BLACK
Special #a 4
Operations Group Rateb 12.3
Tactical # 12
Rate 6.3




Patrol Division # 26
Rate 0.7
Other units # 10
Rate -
TOTAL # 57
a Number of on-duty officers shot by civilians.
b All rates = average annual number of on-duty officers shot by civilians per 1,000
officers assigned to the indicated unit. Personnel figures were obtained from a Chi-
cago Police Department computer printout for 1976.
fruitful to see how much of the variance in shootings of officers can be accounted for by the
crime rate of their residential area, and then to see if race can account for any additional
variance (after controlling for residential area).
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We digress for a moment from Table 3 to examine why on-duty
white and black officers' chances of being shot by civilians are relatively
similar despite the previously noted disproportionate assignment of
black patrol division personnel to high hazard police districts. Table 4
suggests -one explanation. It shows that black officers are under-
represented in most of the units of the Department whose members bear
a high risk of being shot. by civilians.' 0
The units depicted in Table 4 in which black officers are "under-
represented" (a lower percentage than the overall Departmental repre-
sentation of 17.4%)-Special Operations Group, Tactical, and
Robbery--experience an annual average of 5.1 on-duty officers shot by
civilians per 1,000 officers in those units. By contrast, the two units
shown that have an "overrepresentation" of black officers-Gang
Crimes and the Patrol Division-have an annual average of 0.8 on-duty
officers shot by civilians per 1,000 members of those units. These num-
bers are fairly small but, if they are reliable indicators, they suggest that
on-duty officers in units with relatively few black officers are more than
six times as likely to be shot by civilians as officers in units with rela-
tively large numbers of black officers."
Returning to Table 3, we can explore patterns associated with the
crime level of the area in which officers of different races were shot while
on and off duty. White officers are approximately three times more
likely to be shot in high-crime districts when they are on-duty than dur-
ing their time off, largely because most white officers presumably do not
spend much off-duty time in high-crime districts. But black officers,
most of whom presumably spend a large amount of their off-duty time
in such districts, are more likely to be shot in high-crime districts while
oqTdu y than during their working hours (rates of 1.3 versus 0.6). Com-
paring officers of different races, black police are thirteen times more
likely than white police to be shot by civilians in high-crime districts
while off duty (rates of 1.3 versus 0.1). By contrast, off-duty black of-
ficers are only twice as likely as off-duty white officers to be shot by
civilians in low-crime districts (rates of 0.2 versus 0.1). In medium-crime
districts, black officers are 2.5 times more likely than white officers to be
shot by civilians while off duty. This difference may be accounted for by
the possibility that, while some officers of both races reportedly live in
medium-crime districts, a much higher percentage of black than white
officers reside in such areas.
10 See the similar finding regarding shootings by police in part I of this article.
11 Future research utilizing multivariate statistical analysis could examine the variance in
the shooting rate due to the "unit of assignment," the degree of "hazardous area assignment,"
and the officers' race.
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The relation between duty status and patterns of victimization for
officers of different races will be examined further since some notewor-
thy associations have already appeared. Table 5 depicts the shooting
types, duty status and race of the victim officers. The table permits
comparison between the patterns associated with shootings of police by
civilians, on the one hand, and shootings by fellow officers and self-in-
flicted shootings, on the other hand.
Table 5 shows that white and black officers are equally as likely to
shoot themselves accidentally while on duty (rates of 0.2) but that off-
duty black officers are 1.8 times more likely than off-duty white officers
to sustain self-inflicted wounds (rates of 0.9 versus 0.5). This difference
does not seem to be explainable on the basis of the relatively more dan-
gerous environment in which black officers spend their off-duty time,
unless this hazardous environment causes black officers to handle their
guns more often, and hence to experience mishaps more often than their
white counterparts. The number of police shot by fellow officers is prob-
TABLE 5
POLICE SHOT IN CHICAGO, 1974-1978: RACE AND DUTY
STATUS OF OFFICER VICTIMS, BY SHOOTING TYPE
SHOOTING TYPE RACE OF OFFICER VICTIMS
White Black Hispanic TOTAL
(1) By #- 64 39 2 105b
Civilian Total Ratea= 1.2 3.4 1.7 1.6
By On _Qf Qa Qif Qa Qif Qa Qff
Duty 42 22 16 23 1 1 59 46
0.8 0.4 1.4 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7
(2) Self- 37 13 0 50 c
Inflicted Total 0.7 1.1 - 0.8
By Qa OQf Qa Qff Qa Qf Q Qff
Duty 8 29 2 11 0 0 10 40
0.2 0.5 0.2 0.9 - - 0.2 0.6
(3) By Other 10 6 1 17d
Officers Total 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.3
By Qa fl Q Qff Qa ff Qa off
Duty 7 3 4 2 1 0 12 5
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.8 - 0.2 0.1
TOTAL 111 58 3 172c
Total 2.1 5.0 2.5 2.6
By Qa Qff Qa Qff Qa Qff On Qff
Duty 57 54 22 36 2 1 81 91
1.1 1.0 1.9 3.1 1.7 0.8 1.2 1.4
a All rates = average annual number of officers shot per 1,000 officers of the indicated race on the
Chicago police force.
b Not ascertained - 3.
C Not ascertained - 1.d 'Not ascertained 
- 3.
e Not ascertained = 15.
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ably too small to support generalizations, but if any conclusions can be
drawn, the data suggest that black officers are once again over-
represented as victims in both on- and off-duty shootings (rates of 0.3
and 0.2, respectively, versus white officer rates of 0.1 for both on- and
off-duty incidents).
Table 5 also reveals that white and black officers face different
chances of being shot when the categories of self-inflicted shootings and
shootings by fellow officers are combined. One third of all black officer
victims (19) were shot by themselves or fellow officers. For white of-
ficers, however, the corresponding figure is 42%. These figures conceal
larger differences based on the officers' duty status. Only 26% of the on-
duty white officer victims are shot by themselves or other police, but
59% of the off-duty white officer victims are injured by themselves or
their co-workers. On-duty black officer victims are similar to on-duty
white officer victims in this aspect (27% were shot by themselves or other
police) but are quite different when off duty. Only 36% shot themselves
or were shot by other officers, compared to 59% for off-duty white officer
victims. These figures may reflect the fact adverted to earlier,,that black.
officers presumably spend more of their off-duty time in high-crime dis-
tricts thati:do their white colleagues. -
Table 6 considers the race of officer victims from a slightly, different
angle. It reveals their fatality rates, rather than their duty status, ac-
cording to shooting type. The table, while based on small numbers,
shows that a smaller percentage of the black officers who are shot are
fatally injured (14%) than is true of white officers (20%). The percent-
age of fatalities for black officers is lower regardless of whether the per-
petrator is a civilian, the officer himself, or another officer. When the
perpetrator is a civilian, white officers are five times as likely to survive
as they are to be killed (rates of 1.0 .versus 0.2), but black officers are ten
times as .likely to survive as they are to die (rates of 3.0 versus. 0.3)-
Combining officers of all races, a relatively high fatality rate (26%)
is associated with self-inflicted shootings, the result of the inclusion of
officer suicides among these incidents. If suicides are excluded, only 10%
of the officers who shot themselves died. This low rate was anticipated
because accidental shootings normally involve a single, unaimed shot.
Officers shot by civilians stand a better chance of survival (86% live)
than civilians shot by police (only 74% live). This difference is probably
due to differences in the number of shots fired, caliber of weapons and
type of ammunition used, marksmanship of the shooters and defensive
tactics employed by the victims.
Shootings of civilians by police and shootings of police by civilians
[Vol. 73
1982] CHICAGO POLICE SHOOTINGS 343
TABLE 6
POLICE SHOT IN CHICAGO, 1974-1978: SHOOTING TYPE BY
RACE AND INJURY OF OFFICER VICTIMS
SHOOTING TYPE RACE OF OFFICER VICTIMS
White Black Hispanic TOTAL
(1) By #= 64 39 2 105
Civilian Total Ratea 1.2 3.4 1.7 1.6
Woundd- Wb _i W K V K 3y K
Kiled 54 10 35 4 1 1 90 15
&ralown 1.0 0.2 3.0 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.4 0.2
%W&K= 184% 16% 90% 10% 50% 50% 86% 14%
(2) Self- Total 37 13 0 50
Inflicted 0.7 1.1 - 0.8
Wounded- 3y K W K W K W K
Kill'd 27 10 10 3 0 0 37 13
breakewn 0.5 0.2 0.9 0.3 - - 0.6 0.2
73% 27% 77% 23% - - 74% 26%
(3) By Other 7otal 10 6 1 17
Officers 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.3
Wounded- W K W K 3y K A K
Killed 8 2 5 1 1 0 14 3
lreakdown 0.2 0.04 0.4 0.1 0.8 - 0.2 0.1
80% 20% 83% 17% 100% - 82% 18%
TOTAL Total 111 58 3 172d
2.1 5.0 2.5 2.6
Woundd- W K K A K w K
Killd 89 22 50 8 2 1 141 31
&reakdeon 1.7 0.4 4.3 0.7 1.7 0.8 2.1 0.5
90% 20% 96% 14% 67% 33% 82% 18%
a All rates = average annual number of officers shot by civilians per 1,000 officers of the indicated race
on the Chicago police force.
b "W" = wounded.
c "K" killed.
d Not ascertained = 15.
are similar in the patterns which emerge when considering the races of
both the civilians and officers involved in shooting incidents. In part I
of this article, we indicated that shootings of civilians by police are in-
traracial events more often than might be expected. This is true to an
even greater extent for shootings of police by civilians, as Table 7 shows.
Just as black officers and civilians are overrepresented (for the vari-
ous reasons stated) in shootings of civilians by police, Table 7 shows that
black officers are nine times more likely to be shot by black civilians
than white officers are to be shot by white civilians (rates of 2.7 versus
0.3). Further, black officers are five times more likely to be shot by black
civilians than are white officers (rates of 2.7 versus 0.6). Conversely,
black officers are far less likely to be shot by white civilians than are
their.white colleagues (rates of 0.0 versus 0.3). Indeed, over the five
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TABLE 7
INCIDENTS OF POLICE SHOT BY CIVILIANS IN CHICAGO, 1974-
1978: OFFICER RACE BY CIVILIAN RACE
RACE OF CIVILIAN RACE OF OFFICER VICTIMS
SHOOTERS White Black Hispanic Total
White Number 15 0 0 15Ratea 0.3 - - 0.2
Number 34 31 0 65Rate 0.6 2.7 - 1.0
Hispanic Number 9 1 2 12Rate 0.2 0.1 1.7 0.2
Number 58 32 2 92bRate 1.1 2.8 1.7 1.4
a All rates = average annual number of officers shot per 1,000 officers of the indicat-
ed race on the police force.
b Not ascertained = 6 incidents.
years studied, white civilians shot fifteen white officers, but not a single
black or Hispanic officer.1 2 Thus, as was the case with police who shot
civilians, it may be difficult to explain shootings of police in terms of
racial animosity by the shooter towards the victim, although again we
caution that our data are insufficient for drawing confident conclusions
about racial motivation. This does not mean, of course, that an easing
of racial tensions between police and the civilian population would not
benefit both police officers and civilians by reducing violent interactions
that lead to serious injuries of each. Several avenues for attempting to
reduce the number of police-involved shootings in years to come are dis-
cussed later in this article.
II. FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH VARIATIONS IN SHOOTINGS
OVER TIME
The analysis in part I and, thus far, in part II of this article has
combined the five years of shooting data rather than considered how the
number and characteristics of shootings might differ from year to year.
It is also important to examine changes over time. Such changes may
evidence progress or lack of progress in controlling shootings and may
suggest fruitful strategies for controlling shooting frequency.
In part I of this article, dramatic increases and decreases were noted
12 The fact that no black police officer was shot by a white civilian may be explained by a
number of factors, including limited assignment of black officers to white residential areas,
fewer white than black civilians who shot officers, the units of assignment of black officers and
the low percentage of black officers in the Department.
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in the number of civilians shot by police from year to year. This section
seeks possible explanations for those variations. If such explanations can
be found, they may facilitate the efforts of police administrators and
others to reduce the frequency of shootings in the future.
The pattern which this section will examine is depicted in Figure 2.
The figure adds 1979 and 1980 shootings to the five years, 1974-1978,
which are the primary focus of the preceding discussion. (Time con-
straints precluded us from collecting data on the characteristics of the
1979 and 1980 shootings, but we have no reason to believe these shoot-
ings differed substantially in kind from shootings in the years studied.)
Some of the annual percentage changes reflected in Figure 2 are
substantial: The drop from 148 shooting victims in 1975 to 79 in 1976 is
a 47% decrease; shootings in 1978 were down 38% from 1977, but then
FIGURE 2
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rose again by 38% percent in 1979. Despite this "roller coaster" pattern
(some of which is to be expected when dealing with numbers as small,
statistically speaking, as these), an overall decrease of 26% was registered
from 1974 to 1980; the endpoints of the series are presented in Figure 2.
While some encouragement may be taken from this overall decrease, the
increase from 1978 to 1980 represents an upward movement of 62% in
the number of civilians shot by police. Even though we lack the requi-
site data to examine the nature of the shootings in 1979 and 1980, an
increase as dramatic as this seems cause for concern.
Several possible explanations for changes in the annual number of
shootings will be considered below:
(1) changes in the opportunities for shootings, as indicated by variations
over time in the number of forcible felony arrests;
(2) annual differences in the "accuracy" of police gunfire;
(3) annual variations in the number of police officers shot by civilians;
and
(4) departmental initiatives relating to training, discipline, weaponry,
and operations. In this context, variations in the "types" of shootings
which occur from year to year will be examined.
A. FORCIBLE FELONY ARRESTS
As indicated in part I of this article, the theoretical connection be-
tween shootings of civilians and forcible felony arrests is that such arrests
may give some measure of the number of police-civilian encounters with
the potential of ending in shootings. Forcible felony arrests were used
for analysis rather than other categories of arrest (e.g., Index Crimes or
all offenses) because forcible felonies are offenses that justify shootings
under Illinois law.' 3 One would expect the number of shootings over
time to reflect changes in the number of encounters which present "op-
portunities" for shootings. To explore this point, we correlated the
quarterly numbers of forcible felony arrests and civilian shooting victims
from 1974 through mid-1980.14 The figures used for this correlation are
shown in Table 8.
Analysis of the figures in Table 8 shows a positive correlation of .64
between the two events.' 5 The +.64 correlation coefficient suggests that
13 See discussion of Illinois law in part I of this article. Forcible felonies include crimes of
personal violence and burglary.
14 Forcible felony arrest data were not available beyond the second quarter of 1980.
Quarters were used instead of years in order to have more points for the correlation analysis.
15 The range for a correlation is from -I to +1, with negative values suggesting inverse
relationships and positive values suggesting similar movement between two variables. Values
close to zero suggest a lack of relationship. The process of deriving quarterly counts for forci-
ble felony arrests was unexpectedly complicated. The Police Department was not able to
supply records of arrests by months or quarters-only by its "police periods." Each year
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changes in the frequency of shootings are only partially the result of
changes in the opportunity structure as indicated by the frequency of
forcible felony arrests. Accordingly, other explanations must be sought
for variations in shoo~ngs over time. Another way to put this is that the
number of persons ar'rested for forcible felonies may not be a sufficient
measure of the population at risk of being shot by police. This is not to
deny that most of the shootings in our data set are out-growths of forci-
ble felonies. Rather, the correlation suggests that the total number of
civilians shot over time is not simply a function of the frequency with
which forcible felony arrests occur.
Examining the annual changes in shootings and forcible felony ar-
rests from 1974 through 1979 may help illustrate the association be-
tween these two events in a somewhat less technical way. Table 9 shows
these data. The table shows a continual decrease in the number of forci-
ble felony arrests every year until 1979, when such arrests were up
slightly. (The continual decrease in arrests could be the result of popu-
lation shifts from the city to the suburbs. Unfortunately, we were un-
able to obtain annual population estimates for the city.) Against this
clear downward trend is the up-and-down pattern of shootings. If varia-
tions in opportunities, as indicated by the frequency of arrests for serious
crimes, were the key explanation for variations in the number of police
shootings, a clear downward trend would be evident in the number of
civilians shot each year. Yet shootings were up in 1975 and 1977 despite
decreases in arrests. The parallel movement of shootings and arrests in
1976, 1978 and 1979 is made much less significant than it might other-
contains 13 police periods, which are 28 days long and have an identical number of weekends
and weekdays. These periods are used by many police departments for research purposes so
that comparable units of time will be available for the analysis of crime and other events. We
elected to extrapolate quarterly arrest counts from these figures for police periods. We discov-
ered, however, that twice during the seven year period for which we ran the correlation the
Department let a week pass between the end of one year's 13th period and the beginning of
the following year's first period. This is done, apparently, so that the first police period of a
year will always start near the beginning of that calendar year. To accomplish this result,
however, adjustments in the police period calendar do not have to be made nearly as often as
the Department makes adjustments. It would take many years for the first police period to
shift so much that it no longer fell in January. The adverse consequence of frequent adjust-
ments is exemplified by our attempt to estimate the number of forcible felony arrests: two
weeks of arrests are missing from the compilations made by the Department. This is not a
manipulation of arrest statistics for cosmetic purposes, because calendar year arrest totals are
maintained and are available from the Department, but the Department's practice with re-




DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIANS SHOT BY POLICE & FORCIBLE
FELONY ARRESTS IN CHICAGO, BY QUARTER,
1974-MID-1980
YEAR # OF CIVIL- # OF FORCI- SHOOTINGS
AND IANS SHOT BLE FELONY PER 1,000
QUARTER BY POLICEa ARRESTSb F.F. ARRESTS
1974 1 23 5,966 3.86
2 27 6,064 4.45
3 37 6,138 6.03
4 50 5,650 8.84
1975 1 42 6,763 6.21
2 40 6,531 6.12
3 36 5,357 6.72
4 30 5,965 5.03
1976 1 21 5,905 3.56
2 23 5,594 4.11
3 18 5,650 3.19
4 17 4,896 3.47
1977 1 24 4,639 5.17
2 27 4,823 5.60
3 23 5,053 4.55
4 24 4,352 5.51
1978 1 17 4,354 3.90
2 10 4,711 2.12
3 21 4,744 4.42
4 13 4,496 2.89
1979 1 21 4,243 4.95
2 24 4,677 5.13
3 18 4,919 3.66
4 21 4,824 4.35
1980 1 16 4,564 3.51
2 29 4,886 5.94
(r = +.64; r 2 = .41)
a These are the total numbers of civilians shot by police, including accidental events.
While accidents are sometimes not related to criminal activity, the data display a
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TABLE 9
ANNUAL NUMBER OF CIVILIANS SHOT BY POLICE AND FORCIBLE
FELONY ARRESTS IN CHICAGO, 1974-1979
# OF % CHANGE # FORCIBLE % CHANGE
CIVILIANS FROM FELONY FROM
YEAR SHOT PRIOR YR ARRESTS PRIOR YR
1974 137 - 25,860 -
1975 148 + 8% 25,544 - 1%
1976 79 -47% 22,236 -13%
1977 98 +24% 18,980 -15%
1978 61 -38% 18,193 - 4%
1979 84 +38% 18,663 + 3%
TOTAL 607 -39%a 129,476 -28%a
a Change from 1974 to 1979.
wise be because of the 1975 and 1977 patterns. 16 Even in the years with
parallel movement, the percentage change in shootings was considerably
different from the percentage change in arrests.
Thus, it seems that the frequency of forcible felony arrests is only
one among many possible explanations for the frequency of police shoot-
ings of civilians. Another explanation may be changes in the accuracy
of police gunfire from year to year.
B. ACCURACY OF SHOTS FIRED BY POLICE
Data compiled but previously unreleased by the Chicago Police
Department' 7 show the number of incidents in which Chicago police
officers fired shots at criminal suspects, regardless of whether the in-
tended victims were struck by the bullets. Unfortunately, these data are
available only for three years, 1975-1977. But even this short time span
proves informative. Comparison of the Department's "shots fired" data
with our data on the number of incidents in which civilians were shot by
police produces what might be called an "incident hit rate."' 8 This rate
16 The pattern of the first half of 1980 conforms to those of 1975 and 1977. That is,
comparison of the first two quarters of 1980 (shown in Table 8) with the last two quarters of
1979 reveals that, in the first half of 1980, forcible felony arrests were down by 3% but shoot-
ings of civilians were up by 15%.
17 An untitled statistical report compiled in 1978 at the direction of Acting Superinten-
dent Michael Spiotto was the source of these data (hereinafter cited as SPIorTo REPORT).




INCIDENTS OF SHOTS FIRED BY POLICE AND OF CIVILIANS
STRUCK BY POLICE BULLETS IN CHICAGO, 1975-1977
# OF SHOTS- # OF INCIDENTS % OF INCIDENTS
FIRED IN WHICH CIV- RESULTING IN
YEAR INCIDENTS ILIANS WERE SHOT "HITS"
1975 482 138 28.6%
1976 339 75 22.1%
1977 324 95 29.3%
TOTAL 1,145 308 26.9%
reflects the percentage of incidents reportedly involving shooting in which
one or more civilians were struck by police bullets. Table 10 shows the
results for the three years. The table shows a lower hit rate in 1976 than
appears in 1975 or 1977. We are uncertain why police gunfire in 1976
was less likely than in the preceding or subsequent years to strike civil-
ians. One possible reason is that slightly fewer shots were fired per inci-
dent in 1976 than in other years, as Table 11 shows.
According to Table 11, in 1976 an average of 2.7 bullets were fired
per shooting incident, while a slightly higher average prevailed in 1975
and 1977. This difference is so slight, however, that it is not much of an
explanation for a drop in the hit rate in 1976. Table 11 makes clear,
however, that shooting accuracy was down in 1976, assuming that of-
ficers were trying equally hard in all three years to strike civilians at
whom they fired. In 1976, only 11.3 bullets of every 100 bullets fired at
civilians hit their targets. The percentage of bullets that hit civilians in
1975 was 14.7, and in 1977 it was 16.6. For the three years combined,
an average of 14.3 of every 100 bullets fired struck someone. These data
suggest that an officer's ability to strike a civilian at whom he fires prob-
ably is the result of factors other than aim (e.g., number of shots fired,
shooting type, distance between shooter and opponent, etc.).19 In addi-
tion, we may note in passing that whether an officer kills a civilian at
whom he shoots would seem to be more a matter of chance than of
sharpshooting; the marksmanship required for sharpshooting seems to
be lacking since 85.7% of all shots fired at civilians do not make contact.
cates how many of the encounters in which police fired bullets at civilians produced gunshot
wounds. To examine accuracy more directly, one would need to compare the number of
bullets fired at civilians with the number of bullets that struck civilians. This comparison is
made later in the text.




HIT RATE OF BULLETS FIRED BY POLICE IN CHICAGO,
1975-1977
# OF BULLETS AVERAGE #
# OF BULLETS WHICH % RESULTING BULLETS
YEAR FIRED STRUCK IN HITS FIRED/INC.a
1975 1,481 217 14.7% 3.1
1976 918 104 11.3% 2.7
1977 959 159 16.6% 3.0
TOTAL 3,358 480 14.3% 2.9
a In computing the average annual number of bullets fired per incident, the incident count
is taken from Table 10.
This does not necessarily mean that officers are incompetent or poorly
trained in the use of their weapons. Rather, it may simply indicate that
the average shooting situation does not permit precise or accurate
aiming.20
Another possible explanation for the low incident hit rate in 1976 is
that police officers, cognizant of the more deadly capacity of their newly
acquired "hollow point" ammunition-and of strong community objec-
tions to its use-may have made greater use of warning shots in the
several months after the ammunition was furnished. Data compiled by
the Police Department, however, tend to refute this hypothesis. They do
indicate a slight, possibly random increase in 1976 in the percentage of
shots fired as warnings (21% in 1976 compared to 18% in 1975). But a
jump of 27% is reported for 1977, when the hit rate improved and, con-
sequently, one would have anticipated a lower percentage of warning
shots.21 It is possible, however, that reports of warning shots are not
particularly accurate. It is possible that officers were criticized by super-
iors for poor marksmanship in 1976 and that the officers responded in
1977 partly by improving their accuracy and partly by reporting some
of their misses as warning shots.
Yet another explanation for the lower hit rate in 1976 may be
found if officers fired at a proportionally higher number of fleeing sus-
pects that year, suspects whose motions made them harder to hit. But
again the Department's research seems to point in the opposite direc-
tion. In 1975, 40% of all officers who fired their weapons aimed them at
20 These data, along with empirical findings concerning New York and other cities, serve
to debunk the Hollywood-generated myth of the police officer who can shoot accurately
enough to "wing" rather than risk killing a fleeing suspect. See, e.g., Fyfe, supra note 5, at 129.
21 See SPiorro REPORT, supra note 17, at 18.
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fleeing suspects. The following year, 38% fired at fleeing suspects.
While this decrease is admittedly slight, one might have expected a size-
able increase in order to explain the lower hit rate. By contrast, 1977
seems consistent with this expectation, for the hit rate increased and the
percentage of officers firing at fleeing suspects decreased (to 33%). The
inconsistent pattern created over these three years leaves us unable to
explain variations in the hit rate.2
2
We agree with other researchers who have argued that the decision
to pull the trigger is a more critical subject of inquiry than the often
fortuitous result that a person is struck. 23 Future research, to the extent
possible, should examine the characteristics of all "shots-fired" incidents,
not just the more limited set of events that we have studied. By consid-
ering this broader set of events, one can avoid being misled about the
extent of police gun use. One might assume, for example, that a year
with more shooting victims would be a year with more shots-fired inci-
dents and that fewer victims would signal a reduction in the number of
incidents with shots fired. But Tables 10 and 11 show that, in 1977, the
number of incidents with civilian shooting victims increased by 27%
(from 75 to 95) despite an actual decrease of more than 4% in the number
of situations when police fired their weapons. Assuming police faithfully
reported discharging their guns, what appears to have been genuine pro-
gress in 1977 (a reduction in police gun use) was hidden by the possibly
fortuitous result that police gunfire seemed to be more accurate that
year. Put more negatively, if the "heat" of community criticism was off
in 1976, it may have been as much the result of a slippage in marksman-
ship as it was the product of willful restraint by police officers.
In sum, the relatively small set of data which is available on all
shots fired may help explain the drastic reduction in shootings of civil-
ians in 1976 and the subsequent climb in 1977. These data suggest,
more generally, that "shots-fired" information is critical in any effort to
explain variations in the number of persons struck by police bullets.2 4
22 Despite our uncertainty about why the hit rate was lower in 1976, the 1976 rate may
help explain the 47% decrease in the number of civilian shooting victims in that year. If the
28.6 hit rate for 1975 had prevailed in 1976 (instead of 75 incidents with civilian shooting
victims in 1976) there would have been 97 incidents, still a substantial decrease from the
preceding year but not as substantial. Had that been the case, there would have been a slight
decrease in the number of incidents with civilians shot by police in 1977, instead of the actual
increase reported earlier. Had there been such a decrease, it would have paralleled the de-
crease from 1976 to 1977 in the number of forcible felony arrests. So it is possible that varia-
tions in the hit rate mask an otherwise stronger correlation between serious arrest encounters
and police decisions to pull the trigger.
23 See, e.g., M. MEYER, REPORT TO THE Los ANGELES BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSION-
ERS ON POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN Los ANGELES: OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS,
PART IV (July, 1980); Fyfe, siira note 5.
24 The importance of studying all shots fired by police at civilians may be underlined by
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C. POLICE SHOT BY CIVILIANS
At the outset of this research, we were operating on the assumption
that information on shootings of police officers by civilians was critical
for an understanding of shootings of civilians. Our premise, formed af-
ter literature review, was that the number of shootings of police officers
by civilians provided a key index of the level of danger perceived by
police and, accordingly, would be positively correlated with the number
of civilians shot by police. The data do not seem to support this notion.
The number of police officers shot by civilians during the five prin-
cipal study years remained remarkably constant, at least after 1974: 31
officers were shot by civilians victims in 1974, and 19, 18, 20, and 20
were shot in the subsequent four years, respectively. A dramatic illustra-
tion that shootings of police by civilians are only one among many indi-
ces of police risk appears in the data for 1976, which show that 18
officers were shot by civilians and that 17 officers suffered accidental
self-inflicted wounds. If shootings by fellow officers that year are added,
police officers in 1976 actually were placed in greater jeopardy by them-
selves and their colleagues than by armed criminal suspects.25
We tested the correlation between the relatively constant number
of officers shot by civilians and the widely fluctuating number of civil-
ians shot by police and found, not surprisingly, virtually no relationship,
positive or negative. Table 12 indicates the numbers used for the corre-
lation. These numbers resulted in a correlation coefficient of +. 15,
which suggests that the frequency with which civilians are shot by police
in a given year does not vary with the number of officers shot by civil-
ians.26 Thus, shootings of police by civilians do not seem to help explain
changes over time in the number of civilians shot by police. 27 Neither,
then, does it appear that police shooting restraint is associated with
changes in the degree of danger to police from civilian gunfire.
considering the impression one might get of relative shooting levels in Chicago and Los Ange-
les with less extensive information. From 1974 through 1978, Chicago police fired at an esti-
mated 2,876 individuals, striking 523, killing 132 of them. Los Angeles police during the
same period fired at 611 persons, striking 377, killing 139 of them. MEYER, Mfpra note 23, at
12, 15, 31. An examination of only "on-target" shots would be misleading as to the relative
amount of police gunfire in the two cities; a study which, like many studies, looked only at
levels offala/ shootings would be extremely misleading to the uncautious reader.
25 For some reason unknown to us, 1976 was an aberrant year for accidental self-inflicted
police shootings, containing 43% of all such incidents that occurred during the five year study
period. The distribution of accidental self-inflicted shootings by police was as follows: 1974-
10; 1975-7; 1976-17; 1977-2; 1978-4 (Total = 40).
26 A somewhat more sophisticated analysis could examine whether shootings of one type
(either of or by police) may be a delayed reaction to the other type, as opposed to an immedi-
ate reaction; that possibility appears to us to be remote.
27 While neither type of shooting is associated with the other on a systematic basis, for an
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Other researchers have demonstrated that restrictions in written
deadly force policies have been followed by a marked, beneficial impact
on the frequency of police-involved shootings. 28 We could not study the
effect of such policy change because the Chicago Police Department did
not change its written deadly force policy during the years studied. To
the best of our knowledge, only two key initiatives were undertaken by
the Department during these years other than routine training on de-
partmental policy and tactics, which were explicitly intended to control
shootings: (1) The creation, in the fall of 1974, of the Office of Profes-
sional Standards; and (2) in-service classroom training in late 1977 and
28 See, e.g., C. MILTON, POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE (1977); Fyfe, supra note 5.
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early 1978 on departmental deadly force policy, shooting review proce-
dures, and techniques for handling firearms. To the limited extent that
our data permit, we will attempt to identify the impact of these initia-
tives and other departmental variables on the number and nature of
police shootings of civilians.
(1) Ojyie of Professional Standards
The Office of Professional Standards (O.P.S.) was established in
late 1974 in response to a protracted public debate about police brutal-
ity in Chicago. The agency, under the authority of the Superintendent
of Police, was given jurisdiction over police use of excessive force. O.P.S.
investigates the use of non-deadly force only when someone (a civilian
victim or witness, police officer, O.P.S. staff) complains that the force
may have been excessive. However, all police gunfire that hits someone
(civilian or officer) is investigated by the agency, whether or not there is
any initial doubt as to the justifiability of the shooting. Incidents in
which police officers are shot by civilians are not automatically investi-
gated by O.P.S. unless an officer also shoots someone during the same
encounter. The agency's staff2 9 gathers evidence about shootings from
the involved officers, civilians, and witnesses and makes recommenda-
tions to the Superintendent as to whether a shooting was justified or not
under applicable policy and rules. The O.P.S. is staffed by civilians,
unlike its predecessor agency, the Internal Affairs Division of the De-
partment. The I.A.D. continues in operation, but its jurisdiction encom-
passes police conduct other than that involving use of force.
The ideal way to analyze the impact on shootings by police of the
establishment of O.P.S. would be to compare the number and types of
shootings that occurred over reasonably long periods of time prior to
and after the creation of the agency. Unfortunately, we lack the requi-
site data prior to the creation of O.P.S. The office was founded in 1974,
and our data set commences in that year. Nevertheless, we note from
Figure 2, above, that shootings of civilians by police were at the highest
point in any of the seven study years during 1975, the first full year of
O.P.S.' operation. One might argue that it took some time for O.P.S. to
establish a deterrent capability since shootings did fall off rather dra-
matically a year later. We are not able to offer more than speculation
on this point.
Since shooting frequencies before the creation of O.P.S. cannot be
examined, the best alternative is to measure the correlation over time
between the number of O.P.S. decisions (explained below) and the
29 The number of investigators has grown from 33 in 1975 to 63 in 1981. Conversation
with O.P.S. Co-Administrator James Rosas (Jan. 12, 1981).
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number of shootings of civilians. The correlation we have prepared is
between decisions of O.P.S. adverse to the officers under investigation
and shootings of civilians per year. The adverse decisions concern all
O.P.S. cases reported, not just those in shooting cases. (Many shooting
dispositions are not publicly reported by the Department in its annual
statistical reports. The only shootings included in the reported O.P.S.
data used for the correlation are those where O.P.S. staff had some rea-
son at the outset of an investigation to suspect officer misconduct, and so
converted the case file number to a "C.R." number. Cases so converted
were disposed of, like all non-deadly force cases, not with a finding of
"justified" or "unjustified," but with one of the following dispositions:
"unfounded," "exonerated," "not sustained," or "sustained." Only the
last disposition is adverse to the police officer.)3 0
We have chosen to correlate shootings with O.P.S. decisions in cases
that primarily involve use of non-deadly force because insufficient data
are available on O.P.S. shooting dispositions. Since O.P.S. was not cre-
ated until the latter part of 1974, very few determinations were made in
shooting cases during that year. Our data do contain O.P.S. shooting
dispositions for 1975-1977, but 1978 is problematic. Most of the 1978
shootings were still under investigation at the time we completed data
collection from O.P.S. files in 1979, and we were subsequently not able
to return to the files and collect the 1978 data. With only three full
years of O.P.S. findings ascertainable, insufficient points are available to
determine a correlation with shootings.
Our justification for correlating shootings with O.P.S. decisions in
non-deadly force (and a smattering of deadly force) cases is that discipli-
nary decisions pertaining to use of non-deadly force could have a "rip-
ple" deterrent effect on police shootings. If police-administered beatings
are severely punished, officers may reasonably assume that they will also
be harshly dealt with for improperly shooting people. On the other
hand, official tolerance of corporal punishment by officers may lead po-
lice to think that they can administer capital punishment with impunity
as well.
The figures tested for degree of correlation appear in columns "A"
and "B" of Table 13. The 1974 data that are included in this correla-
tion represent the combined I.A.D. and O.P.S. adverse findings in con-
nection with use of force. I.A.D. decisions were included for 1974
because that agency had responsibility for excessive force cases for most
of that year. In each of the following years, the dispositions are solely
those of the O.P.S. The table makes clear that the number of discipli-
nary actions recommended jumped dramatically as soon as the O.P.S.
30 The several O.P.S. dispositions are defined in connection with Table 14 supra.
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was established. The increase from 32 in 1974 to 122 in 1975 represents
a 281% jump in the number of adverse dispositions. Nevertheless, as
indicated above, shootings were at a seven-year high in 1975. The corre-
lation coefficient obtained for the figures in columns "A" and "B" of
Table 13 (ie., correlation between the number of civilians shot by police
and the number of findings of rule or policy violations) was -. 64. The
fact that the coefficient has a negative value suggests the existence of an
inverse relationship between shootings and adverse decisions on excessive
force complaints. The correlation is a moderately strong one. However,
it was not possible for us to determine which event may have helped
cause the other, ie., whether changes in O.P.S. decisions affected the
frequency of shootings or changes in shootings affected the frequency of
O.P.S. adverse decisions. Nor could we determine whether the relation-
ship might be a spurious one, with both shooting and adverse decisions
responding to some other factor or factors. In any case, if either event is
":causal," it is only one factor among several that may affect the fre-
TABLE 13
CIVILIANS SHOT BY POLICE IN CHICAGO & O.P.S. DISPOSITIONS
OF EXCESSIVE FORCE INVESTIGATIONS, 1974-1979
"A" DISPOSITIONS
# OF CIVIL- "B"
YEAR IANS SHOT ADVERSEa FOR OFFICERb TOTAL
1974 137 32c - 32c
1975 148 12 2 d (9%) 1,197 1,319
1976 79 123 (7%) 1,778 1,901
1977 98 174 (8%) 2,155 2,329
1978 61 166 (7%) 2,259 2,425
1979 84 154 (6%) 2,411 2,625
TOTAL 607 771 (7%) 9,860 10,631
Source: C.P.D., STATISTICAL SUMMARY (1974-1979).
a Adverse = a violation of departmental rule or policy was found in connection with
officer's use of force.
b For Officer = no violation of departmental rule or policy was found in connection
with officer's use of force.
C Includes both I.A.D. and O.P.S. decisions on excessive force complaints. I.A.D.
statistics are reported for the period during 1974 (and holdover cases in 1975) when
I.A.D. handled charges of excessive force. Thereafter, all numbers are for O.P.S. A
portion of the complaints registered with O.P.S. are routed to the I.A.D. for investi-
gation, since they fall within the jurisdiction which I.A.D. was given after the crea-
tion of O.P.S. The only cases shown on this table, however, are those relating to
O.P.S.' subject matter jurisdiction-use of force.
d -This number includes 15 holdover I.A.D. cases from 1974 and 107 O.P.S. cases.
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quency of the other event. We may hypothesize, based on the -. 64 cor-
relation coefficient, that, as adverse O.P.S. findings increase, shootings
decrease and that, as such findings decrease, shootings increase. To the
extent that this hypothesis is correct, O.P.S. excessive force determina-
tions may help control police use of deadly force.
TABLE 14
O.P.S. DISPOSITIONS OF SHOOTINGS OF CIVILIANS AND POLICE
BY CHICAGO POLICE, 1975-1977
DISPOSITION YEAR
1975 1976 1977 Total
Adverse Findings:
Unjustifieda 1 2 3 6
Sustainedb 8 7 2 17
............................................................................................................
Subtotal 9 9 5 23
Findings For Ofers:
Justifiedc 116 62 50 228
Not Sustainedd 3 4 2 9
Exonerated" 14 3 23 40
Unfounded f  1 1 1 3
Accidental 0 6 6 12
............................................................................................................
Subtotal 134 76 82 292
TOTAL 143 85 87 3159
a Finding of rule or policy violation in a case where no misconduct was initially sus-
pected and hence the case was not converted to a "C.R." file number.
b Allegation of misconduct was supported by sufficient evidence to justify disciplina-
ry action. Note: A considerable percentage of these findings was premised on rule
or policy violations during shootings deemed justified (e.g., use of unauthorized am-
munition).
C Finding that shooting was within policy and rules in a case where O.P.S. had no
reason at the outset to suspect misconduct and hence did not convert the investiga-
tion to a "C.R." file.
d Allegation supported by insufficient evidence, which could not be used to prove or
disprove the allegation.
e Incident occurred, but action taken by officer(s) was deemed lawful, reasonable and
proper.
f Complaint was not based on facts as shown by the investigation, or reported inci-
dent did not occur.
g This total disagrees with total number of civilians shot in these three years (325)
because the 315 figure includes some findings in cases where officers shot themselves
or fellow officers and excludes several dispositions of shootings of civilians where the
result was not ascertainable.
The O.P.S. decisions specifically dealing with shooting investiga-
tions are indicated in Table 14. The number of adverse findings ascer-
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tained (total of 23, or 7% of all ascertained shooting dispositions for the
three years) is simply too small to work with for purposes of correlations.
Thus, we cannot measure the relationship, if any, between rule and pol-
icy violations found by O.P.S. in shooting cases, on the one hand, and
shootings of civilians, on the other hand. Nevertheless, we would specu-
late that well-publicized punishments of police officers for improper
conduct during shootings could have a beneficial deterrent effect on po-
lice shooting activity. This speculation could be tested in the future by
analysis of the frequency of shootings before and after well-publicized
disciplinary measures taken by the Department against members for
abuses of deadly force.31
(2) In-Service Deado Force Training
The other key initiative aimed at reduction of shootings by police
that was taken during our study period was a one-day, in-service, class-
room training program on the use of deadly force. This program was
started in late 1977 and extended well into 1978. It was prompted by a
variety of factors, principally community outcry after a series of late
1977 shootings of teenagers, most of whom were black and were engaged
in relatively minor misconduct or were the victims of unintentional
shootings.
For present purposes, the most important thing to note about the
content of the training 32 is the key message which the Department at-
tempted to convey to its members. Essentially, that message was that
officers should, in accordance with departmental policy, shoot only as a
last resort, to the extent possible without unduly jeopardizing them-
selves. At roll call training, which supplemented the classroom instruc-
tion, officers were explicitly told to exercise greater restraint in shooting
fleeing burglary suspects, a type of shooting for which the Department
was receiving increasing public criticism.
A difficulty arises in testing the impact of this training. The diffi-
culty is analagous to the obstacle we encountered in attempting to meas-
31 July 22, 1980, may provide an appropriate focal point for an interrupted time series
analysis. On this day, the Cook County State's Attorney and the Chicago Police Superinten-
dent, in a joint press conference, announced murder indictments against three white Chicago
police officers for the alleged beating death of a black man after an altercation on a subway
over the black man's reported refusal to obey the officers' orders to stop smoking. (In Decem-
ber 1981, after a bench trial, one officer was acquitted of all charges and the other two were
found guilty of involuntary manslaughter and official misconduct.) Just hours after this press
conference, the Police Superintendent summoned the press again to announce suspension and
the filing of Police Board charges against another officer for allegedly accepting a $300 bribe
to tamper with a pending case. See Chicago Tribune, July 23, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 2, and § 4
at 1, col. 3.
32 'For details of the training program, see W. GELLER & K. KARALEs, SPLIT-SEcOND
DECISIONS: SHOOTINGS OF & BY CHICAGO POLICE 244-47 (1981).
1982]
GELLER AND KARALES
ure the effect of O.P.S. decisions on shootings. Above, we lacked
sufficient dataprior to the creation of O.P.S., here we lack sufficient data
after the training was administered to conduct an adequate analysis of
impact. We know the number of civilians shot by police in 1978, 1979
and 1980, but we know the distribution of shooting types only from 1974
through 1978.
Within these limitations, some speculations may still be possible.
Considering only the number of civilians shot annually helps us to assess
the Police Department's suggestion 33 that the 1977-1978 training had
some effect in reducing the number of shootings in 1978. (A 38% reduc-
tion was experienced from 98 civilians shot in 1977 to 61 shot in 1978.)
Whatever beneficial effect this training may have had was short-lived.
As noted earlier, after the 1978 decrease the number of civilians shot by
police has climbed steadily.
The annual distribution of shooting "types" provides another basis
for speculation about the effects of the re-training on shootings. Table
15 depicts the types for the years 1974-1978, the only years for which
such data were available. This table shows that in 1978 shootings de-
clined in nearly every category, except for Type 3. which had only one
shooting. A difficulty with simply crediting such reductions to the in-
service training is that an even more dramatic, adross-the-board pattern
of reductions occurred in 1976, without the prompting, so far as we
know, of any special departmental initiative.3 4
Another way to examine the possible impact of the training pro-
gram is to attempt to focus on the kinds of shootings that the training
especially discouraged: shootings that were not a last resort, shootings of
fleeing burglary suspects and shootings by off-duty officers who had
33 The Superintendent made the following points in his January 1979 report to the Chi-
cago Police Board:
Deadly force statistics include all firearms uses by police officers when injury results,
including firing at criminals, accidentally self-inflicted wounds, and suicides. In 1978 the
Chicago Police Department recorded a 22% decrease in these incidents from 1977, a 51%
decrease from the number recorded in 1970. The 1978 experience represents the lowest
number of these incidents since 1969. This decrease can be attributed to a combination
of factors; however, the marked decrease can be attributed to two prime factors: (1) the
roll call training conducted by the command members of the Department on the subject
of deadly force and (2) the ongoing deadly force in-service seminar which is being re-
quired for all sworn members of the Department. This full-day in-service course which
has been reported to the Board since its inception is an intensive review of applicable
state law, Department General Orders, civil and criminal liability and a discussion of
past incidents to surface and improve the attitudinal aspects for the participating
officers.
REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT TO THE PoucE BOARD OF CHicAGo 6 (Jan. 1979).
34 One special patrol program which operated during 1975 was not repeated in 1976,
however, and this may help explain the 1976 decrease. The program was "Operation Satura-
tion," an intensive patrol and arrest operation on public transit vehicles and other facilities.
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TABLE 15
CIVILIANS SHOT BY POLICE IN CHICAGO, 1974-1978: SHOOTING
TYPES OVER TIME
SHOOTING TYPE YEAR
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Total
(1) Gun use/threat 80 61 41 51 31 264
Col.% 58% 42% 52% 54% 51% 51%
(2) Other deadly weapon or phys- 14 26 11 11 10 72
ical force use/threat
Col.% 10% 18% 14% 12% 16% 14%
(3) Other deadly weapon pos- 3 6 1 1 1 12
sessed without threat
Col.% 2% 4% 1% 1% 2% 2%
(4) Flight without other resistance 21 25 18 15 10 89
Col.% 15% 17% 23% 16% 16% 17%
(5) Other reasons for shooting in- 1 4 0 2 0 7
tentionally
Col.% 1% 3% - 2% - 1%
(6) Accidental 10 18 8 10 6 52
Col.% 7% 12% 10% 11% 10% 10%
(7) Mistaken Identity 2 1 0 1 0 4
Col.% 2% 1% - 1% - 1%
(8) Stray Bullet 6 4 0 4 3 17
Col.% 4% 3% - 4% 5% 3%
TOTAL 137 145 79 95 61 517a
Col.% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
a Not ascertained = 6.
been drinking. The training program discouraged such shootings in the
sense that departmental officials indicated to the trainees that the De-
partment would frown on such uses of police weapons. Our data, unfor-
tunately, are not sensitive enough to respond to the question of "last
resort." Our inability to do so stems from the failure of the Depart-
ment's firearms-use report or any other documented part of the review
process to inquire routinely about the availability of other means of
resolving the situations short of deadly force.35
We can, however, address the question of how many fleeing bur-
glary suspects were shot by police before and for a short period after the
in-service training. Table 16 presents the number of fleeing burglary
suspects shot per year, as well as the rate at which they were shot. The
rate represents the number of victims in a year per 1,000 arrests for bur-
35 Such questions should be included in an expanded firearms use report. This recom-
mendation is made with an awareness that officers may be disinclined to answer such ques-
tions and that incentives may need to be created to encourage truthful responses. Ste W.
GELLER & K. KARALES, .sufra note 32, at 192-93.
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glary in that year. Table 16 shows, with admittedly small numbers, that
shootings of fleeing burglary suspects were cut by 50% in 1976, and then
declined by one in each of the next three years. Hence, it is difficult to
note any clear impact on shootings of these suspects produced by train-
ing in 1977 and 1978. Examining the rates of shootings yields much the
same result. While burglary arrestees were 2.6 times less likely to be shot
by officers in 1978 than in 1975 (rates of 1.3 versus 0.5), the differences
in their chances of being shot in 1976, 1977 and 1978 were negligible.
The Department's admonitions36 to officers to leave their guns
home if they were going out drinking may have done some good in 1978,
for the number of off-duty officers who shot civilians after the officers
reportedly had been socializing in a tavern or other place where liquor
was served was cut in 1978. But, as was the case with shootings of flee-
ing burglary suspects, an even more drastic cut was registered in 1976.
The annual distribution of officers who shot civilians following the of-
ficers' reported social drinking was as follows: 1974-16; 1975-11; 1976-1;
1977-9; 1978-2 (Total = 39).37 We do not know whether the 1976 de-
crease was accompanied by similar special warnings about alcohol-re-
lated shootings. If it was, then such warnings may be an effective
control strategy for this particular type of off-duty shooting. The pre-
ceding analysis of the 1977-1978 training program's possible effects does
not rule out the possibility that the training served to keep shootings at a
low level in 1978 and that, but for the instruction, the upward trend we
have seen for 1979 and 1980 would have begun a year earlier.
TABLE 16
CIVILIANS SHOT BY POLICE WHILE FLEEING FROM SUSPECTED
BURGLARIES IN CHICAGO, 1974-1978
CIVILIANS
SHOT BY YEAR
POLICE 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Total
Number 11 14 7 6 5 43
Ratea 1.0 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.5 -
a Rate = number of civilians shot per 1,000 arrests for burglary in the indicated year.
36 At the January 1978 Police Board meeting, Acting Superintendent Michael Spiotto
issued a "call" for police officers to leave their guns home when they went out drinking.
Spiotto declined to go so far as to issue a written order to this effect, a step which Superinten-
dent Richard Brzeczek took in December of 1980 with DEPARTMENTAL GENERAL ORDER 80-
20. See W. GELLER & K. KARALES, supra note 32, at 231 for a copy of the order.
37 Reporting behavior, as well as our data collection methods, may have operated to un-
dercount the number of officer shooters whose activity just prior to involvement in the shoot-
ing was socializing in a tavern/other place where liquor is served.
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Table 15 suggests in another way that variations in the number of
shootings from 1974 through 1978 were not highly influenced by depart-
mental attempts to control shootings. If the Department had been able
to mount effective control strategies, the result presumably would be
disproportionate reductions in shootings which could be characterized
as "non-defense-of-life." The reason for this is that sincerely perceived
defense-of-life situations would appear to be relatively unsusceptible to
control strategies, while situations perceived to be lower-risk encounters
would appear to be highly susceptible to regulation.3 8 But the pattern
of shootings reflected in Table 15 is inconsistent with this logic. The
FIGURE 3
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38 Following the New York City Police Department's adoption in 1972 of a restrictive
shooting policy which, as enforced, prohibited all but defense-of-life shootings, the Depart-
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pattern may be easier to see if shooting types are combined and depicted
over time on a graph. Figure 3 does this. It combines shooting types 1
and 2 from Table 15, which include the most serious civilian behav-
iors-use of guns or other weapons against police officers or others-that
reportedly precipitated shootings. This group of shootings is called "de-
fense-of-life" shootings for purposes of this graph. Figure 3 combines
into a separate group the remaining six shooting types, which, with min-
imal possible exceptions, are generally considerably less likely to place
the lives of the officer shooters in jeopardy. This group is referred to as
"non-defense-of-life" shootings for present purposes.
Figure 3 shows that neither of the reductions in the total number of
shootings of civilians (1976 and 1978) was the result of reductionspn'ma-
nily in "non-defense-of-life" shootings. In both cases, defense-of-life
shootings decreased together with elective shootings. This parallel re-
duction of both groups of shootings may suggest that fewer opportuni-
ties for shootings presented themselves in 1976 and 1978 rather than
that police avoided whatever shootings they could avoid.
It is interesting to note, as Figure 3 shows, that the increase from
1974 to 1975 in the total number of civilians shot by police was pro-
duced not by an increase in defense-of-life shooting (which actually de-
clined slightly that year) but by a jump in the number of "non-defense-
of-life" shootings. A fairly dramatic increase in the number of civilians
shot accidentally was registered in 1975, as Table 15 shows.
Calculations based on Table 15 also show, somewhat surprisingly,
that in 1976, when shootings nose-dived 47% civilians shot for fleeing
represented a larger percentage of total shootings (23% than they did
during any other year. As indicated earlier, one might well have ex-
pected that a substantial overall decrease of the sort experienced in 1976
would be attained by the virtual elimination of elective shootings of this
kind or at least a disproportionate reduction of them. Instead, there was
a lesser reduction of "flight" shootings in 1976 (28%) than there was of
defense-of-life shootings (a combined decrease of 40% in shooting types 1
and 2).
In sum, it is possible that departmental training in late 1977 and
1978 may have done some short-range good in reducing the total
number of shootings of civilians; but it does not seem that specifically
targeted shooting types were reduced by that training. Additionally, it
appears that, at most other times during the years for which we have
data, shootings of civilians by police officers drifted upward and down-
ment experienced a decrease of more than 80% in non-defense-of-life shootings. Fyfe, Adminis-
trative Interventions on Police Shooting Discretion, 7 J. CRIM. JUST. 313 (1979).
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ward, sometimes dramatically, without significantly responding to any
departmental shooting control strategies that may have been employed.
(3) Other Departmental Variables
This section has in no way exhausted the departmental factors that
may affect the frequency of shootings, nor can it do so. Unlike some
research efforts involving other police departments that have been
launched to study the impact on shootings of a specific, previously iden-
tified departmental control strategy, this research has been primarily ex-
ploratory. At the outset, neither the frequency of shootings nor the
existence of administrative efforts to reduce shootings was known to us.
Aside from the two key initiatives just discussed-the creation of O.P.S.
and the in-service training-the Department could not identify any
other measures that might have affected the frequency of shootings.
Hence, we have searched through departmental documents for factors
that could have some impact on shootings. These factors are not all
control strategies. Most of those over which the Department had con-
trol were not designed with shootings in mind, but they may have the
side effect of either increasing or decreasing the frequency of shootings.
We have not tried to isolate specific factors and demonstrate a statistical
connection between them and shooting rate changes, for the data and
analytic techniques necessary for such an undertaking were not avail-
able as a result of various constraints. We have suggested, instead, con-
ceptual connections between the various factors and shooting
frequencies. Identification of some of these departmental variables may
prove helpful to future researchers both within and outside the
Department.
Programs like "Operation Saturation," a patrol operation noted
earlier, could potentially increase the number of shootings by increasing
the number of police-civilian encounters. 39 In a similar vein, increased
use of court summonses instead of arrests for minor offenses frees officers
for more "preventive patrol" and, potentially, for more contacts relating
to serious offenses. Moreover, the use of furloughed and off-duty officers
under special employment programs to compensate for the Depart-
ment's reported shortage of personnel 4 can affect the number of police-
39 According to the Police Department, the program's "heavier and strategic police pa-
trols on Chicago's public transportation system . . . resulted in a 50% decrease in C.T.A.
crime during 1975. The unit challenged 127,000 persons regarded as suspicious, made 48,170
arrests for various crimes, and confiscated 1,606 guns." CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT,
STATISTICAL SUMMARY 15 (1975).
40 Despite a reported shortage of 1,000 employees, the total number of sworn personnel
indicated by computer printouts supplied for this study by the Department remained remark-
ably consistent from year to year. These numbers are as follows: 1974-13,203; 1975-
13,149; 1976-13,363; 1977-13,443; 1978-13,309; 1979-13,203; 1980-12,730; 1981-
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civilian contacts by placing more officers on the streets. In addition,
increased use of civilian employees for desk assignments also frees more
sworn personnel for patrol. On the other hand, the deployment of un-
armed Transit Safety Aides on the public transit system could decrease
the number of police-civilian contacts since the Aides are able to handle
minor problems that otherwise may be referred to sworn police officers.
Not only the number of officers on the streets but the characteristics
of these officers may affect shootings. The return to street duty of of-
ficers who had been in desk jobs for some time may help explain an
increase in the number of accidental shootings, shootings of fleeing sus-
pects and shootings of suspects wielding weapons other than guns. (See
Table 15.) More "street wise" officers, arguably, may keep their cool
better in such situations and resolve them without resort to deadly force.
In addition, the use of off-duty officers and those on furlough for active
duty may place on the streets a group of personnel who are more physi-
cally and emotionally drained than is normally the case. Such officers
might not be as effective as other officers in avoiding shootings.
Just as the placement on the streets of tired officers or officers with-
out current street experience could lead to an increase in shootings, pro-
grams which enhance supervision of patrol officers may deter avoidable
shootings. One such program, introduced by the Department in late
1975, uses "patrol specialists," experienced police officers who work with
recruits during their advanced field training in the districts.41 Similarly,
the appointment of large numbers of temporary or permanent sergeants
could reduce shootings through enhanced field supervision of both ex-
perienced officers and inexperienced ones. The "supervisory sector con-
cept of supervision," introduced in 1976, also provides additional
oversight and evaluation of patrol officers by sergeants. The appoint-
ment of large numbers of sergeants also could have an impact on shoot-
ings because such appointments would probably reduce the number of
patrol officers and, thus, the number of officer-civilian encounters.
Other factors that may affect shooting frequencies by increasing or
12,340. Figures for 1979-1981 were quoted in an interview with Police Superintendent Rich-
ard Brzeczek. Oberman hits police, fre items of budget, Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 24, 1980, at 2,
col. 1.
41 One announced goal of the patrol specialist program was to "help weed out any re-
cruits who, in the opinion of the patrol specialists, won't be able to stand the stress." Patrick
Needham, Dep. Supt., Bureau of Administrative Services, C.P.D., quoted in Wattley, Vet Cops
to Test Rookie Fitness, Chicago Tribune, July 29, 1977 § 3, at 4, col. 6. Then-Superintendent
James Rochford, in announcing the completion of training for the patrol specialist job of 238
veteran officers, indicated that this "training was designed to enable them to recognize any
psychological difficulty being experienced by probationary officers that might impede their
progress toward becoming effective police officers." Rochford indicated that the specialists




decreasing opportunities for shootings are variations in the number of
calls for service and radio dispatches. Calls for service may provide not
only an indirect index of police-civilian contacts, but also a surrogate
measure of the degree to which the community wants to involve police
in the solution of its daily problems. Dispatches provide an alternative
to arrest figures for gauging the frequency of police-civilian contacts,
although dispatches would not reflect officer-initiated contacts or en-
counters that resulted from civlians flagging down police on the streets.
Increases or decreases in the relative accessibility of guns on the
streets, as reflected in the number of firearms homicides or gun confisca-
tions in a given time period, may also impact on shooting frequencies.
The more guns, the greater the perception of danger officers may have.
Such differences in gun availability would probably have to be substan-
tial, however, to have any effect on police shooting behavior. 42
Finally, changes in the frequency of range firing for sworn person-
nel may have some impact on their confidence in and competence with
their weapons. When the Department made its controversial switch to
"hollow point" ammunition in 1975, officers began receiving twice-a-
year range practice, instead of the annual practice which had prevailed
for some time. Extra instruction in the safe handling of sidearms and
shotguns, which may be part of roll call training or in-service programs
at the Police Academy, may also have a beneficial impact in reducing
shootings, especially accidental ones.
Future research could explore the effect of these and other factors
through multivariate analysis and other appropriate statistical tech-
niques. While none of these factors seems as dramatic as a change in a
written deadly force policy, they represent the kind of subtle opera-
tional, supervisory and training initiatives which, collectively, could set
a "tone" that will affect officer shooting discretion.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS-SHOOTING CONTROL STRATEGIES
The object of any control strategy is to limit the frequency of shoot-
ings that are avoidable (a considerably larger group of incidents than
those which are illegal or beyond departmental policy). Some shootings
by and of police simply do not seem avoidable, even with the benefit of
hindsight. Still, a great many of the incidents we studied might have
been susceptible to nonlethal, safe solutions.43 The data in this study
and in other empirical research suggest that police-involved shootings
may be amenable to a variety of control strategies. The data also sug-
42 See genera/(y S. BRILL, FIREARM ABUSE: A RESEARCH AND PoLIcY REPORT (1977).
43 For a listing of factors bearing on the avoidability of shootings, see W. GELLER & K.
KARALEs, supra note 32, at 180-81.
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gests, however, that no single strategy seems suitable for the reduction of
all types of shootings.
The several control strategies set forth in this section are attempts
to prevent shootings that are avoidable for any of a variety of reasons.44
Most of the strategies presented are closely related to a number of key
findings, which are summarized briefly now and developed more fully as
necessary in the course of presenting specific strategies. Of primary im-
portance is the implication of the typology (depicted in Figure 1 in part
I of this article and in Table 15 in this part) that at least a third of all
shootings of civilians by police are prompted by civilian conduct that
does not immediately jeopardize the lives of responding officers or the
public at large. Hence, rules prohibiting certain types of shootings have
the potential to save lives without imposing unreasonable 45 risks on po-
lice or other innocent persons.
Although rule changes may fill a need with respect to reduction of
intentional shootings by police, they do not seem well-suited to correcting
bad habits (e.g., carrying guns in the cocked position) which have led to
a large number of accidental shootings-shootings in which both civil-
ians and police have been the victims. Accordingly, strategies are
needed that show promise of controlling both "elective" and uninten-
tional shootings. Rule changes also show little promise of providing of-
ficers with the non-lethal tactical skills (e.g., techniques for approaching
suspects) that probably could help them avoid intentionaly shooting or
being shot by a number of civilians. Tactical training and training in
weapons handling, therefore, seem to be very important control
strategies.
But the crime situations where the most tactical training may be
required are not necessarily those which are currently given the greatest
emphasis in police academies. For example, considerable attention is
devoted (admirably) to the non-violent resolution of domestic disputes,
but relatively little time is spent on techniques for approaching the scene
of a suspected robbery. These training priorities may be premised on
the belief, contradicted by our data, that police face greater hazards
from quarreling family members than from robbery suspects.
Just as the data suggest that police perceptions of police shootings
may be incorrect on the dimension of the relative danger posed by dif-
ferent crime situations, so our analysis, while inadequate to be conclu-
sive, casts some doubt on the belief, widely held in some segments of the
community, that racism is responsible for a large proportion of police-
44See text accompanying note 50 infra.
45 Value choices are involved in deciding whether the risks are reasonable or not, and we
recognize that fair-minded people can reach different conclusions on this point.
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involved shootings. While efforts to erase racial tensions between police
and the community are obviously desirable for many reasons, it is possi-
ble such efforts may not produce a marked reduction in the frequency of
police shootings.
The data address another issue with important implications for cer-
tain policy development proposals-specifically, those proposals which
recommend shortening the list of felonies that justify use of deadly force
to capture fleeing suspects. Such proposals typically involve striking
burglary from the list. Our findings raise questions about whether such
a reform approach is ideal, although we concede that it would be prefer-
able to leaving the current Chicago policy unchanged.46 Deadly force
policies which, like Chicago's, deal with the fleeing suspect situation by
listing specific offenses, are usually premised on one key generalization:
that persons who may have committed these offenses are sufficiently vio-
lence-prone that they are likely to inflict serious injury on someone in
the near future if not apprehended immediately. Whether or not this
generalization is accurate is open to debate. Our data do not address
the point of fiture violence. What -the data do show, however, is that
among the 523 civilians shot by police during our study period not all
exhibited violent behavior even at the time they were shot. Indeed, the
burglary suspects shot by police most often were shot for fleeing, and
there was little evidence in police records that the shooting officers had
any basis for suspecting that the alleged burglaries involved personal
violence.47 The probably accurate generalization that burglars typically
do not inflict injury on crime victims underlies the reform proposals to
strike burglary as a shooting justification. The problem with any ap-
proach that involves such generalizations is that these generalizations
have important exceptions.
Some of the burglary suspects shot by police in our study were fired
upon after threatening officers with deadly weapons. Those who would
eliminate burglary from the list of shooting justifications could accu-
rately respond that such suspects could still be shot by police, even after
burglary was deleted, in light of the officer's right to defend his or an-
other person's life. Generalizations about future dangerousness, we sub-
mit, are likely to lead officers to unthinking, categorical responses to
fleeing felony suspect cases. For example, if, as is the case in Chicago,
robbery is among the deadly force policy's set of forcible felonies, then,
we would argue, officers will be inclined to fire at fleeing robbery sus-
46 Burglary suspects constituted nearly half of all suspects shot by Chicago police for flee-
ing, so the elimination of burglary from the set of forcible felonies which justify lethal capture
could dramatically affect the number of "fleeing felon" shootings.
47 See W. GELLER & K. KARALES, sufira note 32, at 30, for a discussion of the legislative
intent behind the Illinois deadly force statute.
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pects without stopping to think about the probable dangerousness of the
individual in flight. Our data have shown that a number of armed rob-
bery suspects offered no resistance to police other than flight. Yet, one
may well expect from the threat of violence inherent in an armed rob-
bery that the robbery suspect would violently confront responding po-
lice officers. Because the relationship between the seriousness of the
suspected crime and future dangerousness has not been established, we
would prefer a deadly force guideline which made the immediate dan-
ger posed by the suspect, rather than the nature of his possible criminal
offense, the justifying factor.48
Also important in devising control strategies is an awareness that a
significant number of shootings by police and a majority of shootings of
police take place while the participating officers are off duty. Preventive
measures aimed at such shootings may need to address concerns which
would be largely irrelevant to the reduction of on-duty shootings. For
example, off-duty officers may be carrying their guns when they are
drinking alcohol; off-duty officers do not routinely carry police radios
and thus cannot depend on instant communication with the department
in emergencies; and, like on-duty plainclothes police, off-duty officers
typically intervene on their own initiative and thus lack the "legiti-
macy" and time for mental preparation that derive from a civilian call
for assistance and that may tend to deter forceful resistance to police
authority.49
Just as policy and training may need to be tailored to suit special
considerations associated with off-duty shootings, so control strategies
may need to address different issues with respect to different units of
police departments-units which frequently are engaged in quite dispa-
rate types of police work. Although police in nearly every major unit of
the Chicago Police Department have been involved at one time or an-
other in shootings, officers in a handful of units are far more likely than
other sworn personnel to shoot civilians and to be shot by civilians while
on duty.
Our analysis of police shooting files, coupled with a review of the
literature and consultation with police administrators and front-line
personnel, suggests the need for control strategies that prohibit certain
types of "elective" shootings, supplement officers' human relations and
non-lethal tactical skills, and correct bad gun handling habits. Such
strategies should be framed with an awareness of particular require-
ments for the regulation of off-duty shootings and shootings by officers
48 We say "immediate" danger because clinical research suggests that people are remarka-
bly inaccurate in predicting whether an individual will engage infuture violent behavior on
the basis of his past conduct. See id. at 187.
49 Se A. REiss, JR., supra note 7.
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in specialized units. Furthermore, deadly force policies should not be
based on generalizations about the relative dangerousness of suspects in
different types of crimes.
The control strategies set forth briefly50 below are by no means the
only reasonable ways to work toward the reduction of "avoidable"
shootings, but they seem to be promising ones. A number of these strat-
egies or variations of them are already being used by some police depart-
ments, including the Chicago Police Department. We urge police
administrators to give serious consideration to employing all these tech-
niques in their on-going efforts to control police shootings.
General considerations bearing on the avoidability of shootings by
police include the following: (1) the degree to which the officer's or an-
other person's life would be immediately endangered if the officer did
not shoot; (2) the availability of alternative, less violent means of cap-
turing a suspect; (3) the extent to which the officer can obviate use of
deadly force against a potentially violent suspect by using better search
and field interrogation techniques or by maintaining cover and control-
ling the situation until a non-lethal capture can be accomplished;
(4) the degree of risk to bystanders which might be posed by police use
of deadly force; (5) the reliability of information upon which the of-
ficer's irreversible decision to shoot is made; and (6) the extent to which
officer carelessness, nervousness, bad gun handling habits or other "cor-
rectable" factors were largely responsible for the shooting.
Applying these criteria to the data presented in this part and in
part I of this article leads to the conclusion that a sizeable number (at
least a third) of shootings by police officers are avoidable. Many such
shootings are prompted by civilian conduct that does not immediately
jeopardize the lives of officers or the public (non-violent flight being a
prime example). Others seem to be the result of poor gun handling hab-
its (carrying cocked revolvers, carelessness in gun cleaning, etc.). In
many cases, greater tactical and human relations skills could have given
officers the "strategic edge" necessary to permit them to resolve a poten-
tially violent encounter without firing their weapons or placing them-
selves in grave danger.
The control strategies fall into four basic areas: policy develop-
ment, policy enforcement, personnel practices, and training and weap-
ons. The first area, policy development, is certainly the most
controversial. Nonetheless, we recommend the adoption of a "defense-
of-life" shooting policy, with the following as its core message: 5' A police
50 For a fuller discussion of these strategies, see W. GELLER & K. KARALES, sufira note 32,
at 183-200.
51 We recognize that amplification is required on a number of points, such as shooting as
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oftcer isjustified in using deadl force only when such force is intended to defeat a
present threat to the officer's or anotherperson-s life. This policy is justified on a
number of grounds, including the following: (1) It justifies shootings
based on information easily and instantly available to officers in the
field-their honest perception of immediate danger-rather than on
generalizations about the future dangerousness of persons suspected
(rightly or wrongly) of having committed any one of a series of enumer-
ated felonies; (2) the recommended policy, which admittedly is based to
an important extent on value choices, would not inhibit police officers
from shooting when they honestly felt it was necessary to protect their
own or someone else's life; (3) the shooting of a person who is not imme-
diately jeopardizing someone's life may be discovered subsequently to
have been prompted by misinformation about the shooting victim's
prior or likely future conduct--even if predictions about the future
"dangerousness" of a fleeing suspect are based on accurate information
about past behavior, such predictions have been demonstrated by
clinical experiments to be woefully inaccurate; (4) policies which do not
restrict shootings to defense-of-life situations permit the killing of people
for the possible commission of crimes that they would never be executed
for if convicted; and (5) very often, "lethal capture" of nonthreatening
suspects fails to accomplish its ostensible purpose-to take a criminal
suspect alive and bring him to trial. To the contrary, the use of deadly
force without the necessity to defend life has engendered widespread re-
sentment of police, especially in minority communities, making the
broad spectrum of police work that much more difficult.
The defense-of-life and other restrictive policies have been gaining
increasingly widespread support. They have been adopted by a number
of police departments 52 with considerable success. Such policies have
helped reduce the number of shootings of civilians andpolice ofters with-
out adversely affecting arrest rates.53 For example, in New York City,
fewer civilians and police were shot following the adoption in 1972 of a
policy which, as enforced, imposed a defense-of-life standard on of-
a last resort, the reasonableness of the officer's perception of danger and whether the policy
should be a matter of state law or departmental regulation.
52 For example, the defense-of-life policy is in use in New York City, Washington, D.C.,
New Orleans, Atlanta, Newark, Detroit, Oakland, Kansas City, Mo., Houston, San Jose,
Reno, and a number of small-to-medium-size departments throughout California. In addi-
tion, most federal law enforcement agencies employ the policy, including the FBI; Secret
Service; Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Customs; IRS; Drug Enforcement Administration;
and U.S. Postal Inspectors. Many departments impose other,, less stringent, 'restrictions, such
as prohibiting shooting at non-violent burglary suspects, prohibiting shots at or from moving
vehicles, and prohibiting warning shots. See W. GELLER & K. KARALES, rupra note 32, at 20-
52.
53 See id. at 39-41, 183-87.
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ficers.54 In Kansas City, a marked reduction in shootings of young peo-
ple followed the promulgation by that department of a rule forbidding
shots at juveniles, except in defense of life. 55 And in Oakland, the Chief
concluded some years ago that a prohibition of shooting at nonviolent
burglary suspects avoided much bloodshed and failed to affect adversely
the apprehension rate for such suspects.5 6 These and other positive ex-
periences with restrictive policies have led to advocacy of the defense-of-
life policy or very similar policies by many empirical researchers and
legal commentators, as well as public officials and community leaders
and their agencies or organizations. 5 7
While the essence of a policy on when to shoot should not differ for
on- and off-duty officers, we offer for consideration .everal recommenda-
tions respecting off-duty shootings which could be a part of a compre-
hensive deadly force guideline. Of prime importance are the following:
-Off-duty officers should generally be prohibited from carrying guns
when they anticipate consuming alcoholic beverages. 58
-Greater restrictions should be imposed on the types of weapons that may
be carried by officers, and consideration should be given to tightening the
minimum standards of proficiency required of officers with these weapons.
A disproportionate number of accidental self-inflicted wounds were suf-
fered by officers using weapons other than service revolvers (especially
54 Fyfe, supira note 38.
55 C. MILTON, supra note 28.
56 C. Gain, Discharge of Firearms Policy: Effecting Justice Through Administrative Reg-
ulation (Dec. 23, 1971) (unpublished statement). See also Tsimbinos, Thejusti&id Use of Dead
Force, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 3 (1968); Uelman, Varieties of Police Poi'y: A Study of Police Poliy
Regarding the Use of Dead.1y Force in Los Angeles County, 6 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1 (1973).
57 Included among these advocates are the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; the New
York State Division of Criminal Justice Services; Atlanta Public Safety Director Lee Brown;
Newark Director of Public Safety Hubert Williams; San Jose Police Chief Joseph McNamara;
Community Relations Service (of the U.S. Justice Department) Director Gilbert Pompa; Po-
lice Foundation President Patrick V. Murphy; the National Organization of Black Law En-
forcement Executives; the National Black Police Association; Police Executive Research
Forum Executive Director Gary Hayes; International Association of Chiefs of Police Deadly
Force Research Project author Kenneth Matulia; the National Urban League; the American
Civil Liberties Union; the N.A.A.C.P.; the National Minority Advisory Council on Criminal
Justice to L.E.A.A.; the Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group; the Public Interest Law
Center of Philadelphia; the Chicago Council of Lawyers; former Cook County (II.) State's
Attorney Bernard Carey; and researchers Lawrence Sherman, James Fyfe, Kenneth Clark,
Richard Harding, Richard Fahey, Ralph Knoohuizen, and Paul Takagi. For citations to the
position statements of these individuals and agencies, see W. GELLER & K. KARALEs, supra
note 32, at 39-40, 183-85.
58 We have not taken a position on the broader question of whether off-duty police should
be permitted to carry guns at all because insufficient data exist on which to form an opinion.
Research should be conducted on the productivity of off-duty police (number and quality of
arrests and other types of service, including deterrence, etc.) and the possible risks to off-duty
officeis that may stem from their being unarmed. One of the leading commentators has
taken a position against the arming of off-duty officers. See Fyfe, supra note 1.
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semi-automatic handguns). (Several of these points relating to weapons
should be considered for on-duty officers as well.)
-Police officers may need additional guidance in the kinds of incidents to
which they should respond while off duty and special reminders about the
dangers of resolving their own disputes by taking police action. The un-
availability to off-duty officers of police radios with which they could in-
stantly summon assistance and check information, such as automobile
registration, may make it inadvisable for off-duty police to intervene in
situations which do not obviously require immediate police attention. To
similar effect are the reduced mental preparation time and legitimacy of
off-duty officers as compared to on-duty officers. 59 As the Police Founda-
tion urged in its 1977 report on police shootings, "off-duty officers should
avoid becoming involved in minor incidents or fights and should be wary
of using their police office to try to adjudicate disputes to which they them-
selves are party."6°
A defense-of-life standard or any other policy is only as good as its
enforcement. A number of control strategies seem appropriate for pol-
icy enforcement, some of which are already used and others of which are
presently under consideration by the Chicago Police Department.
A key mechanism for policy enforcement is investigation of every
reported shooting to determine the justifiability of the officer's conduct
and the degree of any punishment that may be warranted. Presently,
the Chicago Police Department's civilian-staffed Office of Professional
Standards (O.P.S.) has prime responsibility for investigation of shoot-
ings. The deterrent impact, if any, that O.P.S. findings have is difficult
to determine from the data we have collected. 6 1 In theory, at least, it
would seem that a review system that meted out significant--or at least
consistent-penalties to errant police officers and offered support to of-
ficers who complied with relevant rules should help prevent other of-
ficers from engaging in wrongful shootings.
Perhaps as important as review of a shooting case to determine
whether punishment is justified is review to determine whether, even if
justified, the shooting was avoidable. Toward this end, we suggest that
the Chicago Police Department seriously consider the creation of a
"shooting review panel," in addition to the O.P.S., which would be com-
posed both of senior police administrators (including some from the
training division) and of officers of the same rank as the officer whose
shooting is under review. This panel would review all shots fired by
59 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
60 C. MILTON, supra note 28.
61 See text accompanying notes 29-31, for a discussion of the correlation over time be-
tween O.P.S. decisions and shootings by police. Also complicating the effort to assess the
impact of O.P.S. shootings is the consistent lack of public disclosure of the outcomes of O.P.S.
shooting investigations. The Police Department's annual statistical report should include the
results of O.P.S.' shooting investigations, just as it currently reports O.P.S. dispositions of non-
fatal force cases.
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police, whether or not anyone was struck by the bullets. Although juris-
dictional details vis-a-vis the O.P.S. would have to be worked out, the
main purposes of this panel would be different from those of O.P.S. The
panel would debrief officers and others involved in shootings-both
shootings by and shootings of police; refer officers for any necessary
counseling or retraining (or for appropriate commendations); and iden-
tify systemic methods of reducing shootings of and by police consistent
with officer and public safety.6 2 These systemic methods, which should
be referred for consideration to appropriate departmental officials,
might include revision of all of the following elements, among others:
the disciplinary system; classroom, range, and field training; the supervi-
sion and accountability structures that apply to front-line personnel;
psychiatric and family counseling; hiring and promotion criteria; de-
ployment and dispatching techniques.
Such a panel would need to collect different kinds of information
on shootings than is currently collected for disciplinary purposes and
would need to treat police officers as "expert witnesses" on the question
of how to improve departmental policies, training, supervision and oper-
ations so as to obviate shootings and ensure officer and public safety.
Other promising policy enforcement techniques might include field su-
pervision, communication by headquarters to district-level administra-
tors of information about patrol officers who are "violence-prone," and
review of police shootings not only by the Police Department but by
local and federal officials and, with appropriate safeguards, by private
entities.
A third control strategy concerns personnel practices. Officers
should be hired, promoted, and commended or disciplined with an
awareness that, while "toughness" is critical to the police role, an impor-
tant component of police work is nonviolent problem solving. Psycho-
logical screening tests and routine monitoring of officer behavior should
62 The recommendation that a shooting review panel be considered raises some practical
issues which will need to be addressed in connection with the establishment of such a panel.
For example, the possibility of expanded civil or criminal liability of individual officers and
the city based on information disclosed to the review panel would need to be considered.
Research should be conducted to determine how other police departments (e.g., New York
City and Los Angeles), which have entities somewhat like the proposed review panel, have
resolved thesd liability questions. It is possible that legislation would be appropriate to pro-
hibit in court use of information disclosed to the review panel. (The officers involved, how-
ever, could still be subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury.) On the other hand, it may be
that other departments have found it appropriate and feasible to take the position that full
disclosure of information pertaining to shootings is so important that it is worth increasing the
chances of individual and municipal liability to get it. Police morale issues would need to be
addressed also, for a multiplicity of shooting reviews could prove counterproductive if police
respond by refusing to engage in appropriately aggressive police work. See W. GELLER & K.
KARALEs, supra note 32, at 33-34.
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be used to the extent that they can help separate officers who would
properly exercise their discretion to use deadly force from those who
would not.
After identification of officers who need some special attention, a
number of options are available, such as supportive psychological coun-
seling, reassignment to more appropriate duty, punishment, and re-
training. The last option-and our fourth area of control strategies-is
an essential control technique with as much promise as policy develop-
ment for reducing the incidence of police shootings.
Police officers must be armed not only with the service revolver but
with a battery of nonviolent strategies to control and defuse dangerous
situations. If training does not provide officers with effective alterna-
tives to the use of deadly force, policy statements demanding that such
force be used only as a last resort will be of little benefit other than for
public relations purposes. Training should encompass teaching depart-
mental policy, human relations skills and tactical skills.
Policy should be taught in such a way that a department's position
is not simply a set of phrases, like a Miranda warning, to be memorized
by officers almost without regard to the meaning of its words. This sug-
gests that policy should be explained, as it is currently by Chicago Police
Department trainers, with the aid of realistic fact situations. Addition-
ally, it would be very useful if policy could be applied by officers in
mock role-playing sessions, which may not now be done to full advan-
tage by the Department.
Human relations techniques should be given prominence at the
training academy. In addition to teaching police officers about unfamil-
iar cultural traditions of Hispanics and blacks, more attention might
profitably be paid to teaching basic techniques for nonviolent persua-
sion.6 3 Inevitably, police officers sometimes must resort to force if they
are to perform their job adequately, but the occasions when force is nec-
essary could probably be decreased with the aid of creative human rela-
tions training.
Skills for defusing potentially violent encounters and nonviolently
resolving them with a minimum of risk to the officers and innocent by-
standers are sorely needed. Our data suggest that the vast majority of
the officers who shot civilians had no cover at the time of the shooting.
We are unable to determine how many of these officers could have
63 A Chicago Tribune poll in late 1978 found that 45% of the sampled black residents of
Chicago agreed with the statement that police officers in their neighborhood "do not show
respect for people and use insulting language." Perhaps more important, 71% of the respon-
dents aged 18-24, a group which has a disproportionate share of violent encounters with po-
lice, answered this survey question affirmatively. Hartzell, Crime, Unemplopment, Blacks' Top
Problems, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 16, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
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availed themselves of some protective barriers, but we assume that an
intensive training cycle focused on maintaining cover and positioning"
while dealing with potentially dangerous suspects would significantly
help reduce the number of shootings.
Other areas for improvement include: (1) training officers as to
when "heroic" action on their part is commendable and when it could
prove counterproductive; (2) developing new field decision-making ap-
proaches that bring supervisors whenever possible into the decision of
whether and when to shoot, so that use of deadly force need not so fre-
quently be a "split-second decision;"' 65 and (3) providing an outdoor
training facility which would expand the capacity of departmental
trainers to prepare police officers to be more effective with less
bloodshed.
Several recommendations can also be made concerning weapons,
including: (1) increased range practice and instruction in the handling
of service revolvers and other guns; (2) greater restrictions on the types
(and possibly the number) of handguns officers can carry; (3) modifica-
tion of service revolvers to preclude "single-action firing," a method that
'involves cocking the weapon, which has been responsible for a number
of accidental shootings of civilians and police officers; and (4) explora-
tion of the extent to which modern, "less-lethal weapons" can be used,
as they are in several other departments, to facilitate effectively the non-
lethal capture of certain kinds of criminal suspects.66
All of these control strategies depend for their effectiveness on accu-
rate information about the nature and extent of the control needed and
on feedback about the impact of the strategies on shootings. Future re-
search,67 whether performed by outsiders, the Chicago Police Depart-
ment's own researchers, or a combination of the two, would provide
additional information useful for further reducing police-involved shoot-
ings. These inquiries will only be possible if the Police Department rou-
tinely collects and analyzes or permits others to collect and analyze -the
necessary data on police-involved shootings.
This study has looked at phenomena known as "police shootings," a
subject about which little has been known but much has been said.
Widely disparate kinds of interactions are encompassed by the term-
64 By "positioning" we have in mind an expansion of the kind of training already given to
Chicago police officers on how to approach a driver in a traffic stop so that the officer is able
to see the suspect's hands and the suspect is not able to view easily the officer without turning.
For a discussion of various "officer survival" techniques that facilitate non-violent resolution
of potentially serious police-civilian encounters, see Fyfe, supra note 1.
65 Reiss, Controlling Police Use of Deadty Force, 452 ANNALs 122 (1980).
66 For more detail concerning several of these recommendations, see W. GELLER & K.
KARALEs, spra note 32, at 180-205.
67 See id at 201-03, for a list of topics needing further empirical research.
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from self-defense shootings to self-inflicted shootings. The different
types of shootings are susceptible to very different types of control, and
no single strategy for reducing shootings is relevant to all types of events.
Police and the public at large have a common interest in identifying and
employing the most effective control strategies possible, for the divisive
impact that police-involved shootings can have on the community un-
dermines all other efforts to combat crime and ensure public safety.
More effective use of police policy, training and review processes can
better equip officers to resolve creatively, deliberately and successfully
many potentially violent situations without resort to deadly force.
